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Abstract
We demonstrate how a target model’s generalization gap
leads directly to an effective deterministic black box member-
ship inference attack (MIA). This provides an upper bound on
how secure a model can be to MIA based on a simple metric.
Moreover, this attack is shown to be optimal in the expected
sense given access to only certain likely obtainable metrics re-
garding the network’s training and performance. Experimen-
tally, this attack is shown to be comparable in accuracy to
state-of-art MIAs in many cases.
Personal data has become a commodity to be bought, sold,
and analyzed for making predictions into how people will
behave. One primary concern is protecting sensitive per-
sonal information against extraction from analytic tools and
from aggregate data. This personal information can include
birthdays, medical records, etc., that individuals may wish
to not be publicly accessible. A recent trend in utilizing this
personal data is the development of application program-
ming interfaces (APIs) that expose a model trained on this
data. These APIs are made available to companies and in-
dividuals, thus giving them some of the utility of the data,
without granting them access to the data directly. Typically,
users may query the model on particular inputs and receive
the model’s output, but cannot access the model directly.
Sensitive information is used to train these models, however
this sensitive information is not intended to be available to
the APIs’ users. Unfortunately, this may not always be the
case, as APIs utilizing overfit models have been shown to be
vulnerable to attackers attempting to extract this informa-
tion. This work gives an upper bound on how effective such
an attack can be when the attacker has limited knowledge of
the model’s training and performance.
In a membership inference attack, we consider the at-
tacker as having access to all input-label data points z =
(x, y), the target model’s output on input x, which we denote
as M(x), and some auxiliary information regarding the tar-
get model’s performance (specified later). The attacker then
aims to determine whether z belongs to the training set used
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to fit target model M ’s parameters. More details are pro-
vided in the Attack Setting section. We note that the attack
outlined in this paper is still effective in the more general
context of determining membership within an arbitrary set.
It could be employed for an arbitrary set as long as the at-
tacker has similar auxiliary information for the set of inter-
est.
For membership inference, this paper provides a simple
and theoretically optimal attack strategy (under certain con-
ditions). Although our attack requires auxiliary information
regarding the target model’s performance, the information
needed by the attacker could be obtained either through
knowledge of how the model is created or by ‘modeling
the model’ through the creation of shadow models, first in-
troduced in (Shokri et al. 2017). Thanks to the optimal-
ity of our method, we obtain a bound on the effectiveness
of any attack, provided the attacker does not possess addi-
tional information beyond what we assume. We then com-
pare our strategy to state-of-the-art membership inference
attacks that have access to potentially much more informa-
tion than our attack. Our results help to shed light on which
information is likely being used in these membership infer-
ence attacks, and thus reveal which techniques, if any, might
be useful in shielding against these attacks.
Related Work
The topic of membership inference attacks has been of
growing interest within the past decade. Differential privacy
has been one of the major tools used to try to formalize the
notion of being secure against membership inference. Al-
though the topic of Differential Privacy is quite old and dates
back many decades, the formalized concept of ε-Differential
Privacy was introduced by Dwork et al., 2006 in (Dwork
et al. 2006) and lead to an abundance of related research in-
cluding its application to machine learning (Ji, Lipton, and
Elkan 2014; Abadi et al. 2016; Phan, Wu, and Dou 2017; Yu
et al. 2019). A typical idea behind the application of differ-
ential privacy is to apply Gaussian mechanisms to the train-
ing procedure (or the objective function (Wang, Kifer, and
Lee 2019) used to train the network). This can be mathemat-
ically proven to provide some level of security (see (Balle
and Wang 2018) for a work devoted specifically to Gaussian
mechanisms). In practice, it also leads to a loss in perfor-
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mance and so trade-offs have to be made between privacy,
training time, and accuracy. Importantly, our approach only
considers the generalization gaps between the training and
testing accuracy on various subsets of the data. It follows
that whatever protection from our attack is afforded through
differential privacy techniques is only the result of affecting
the accuracy of the model.
This is not the first result along the lines of demonstrat-
ing that security comes at a cost of affecting usefulness.
Another metric of privacy is k-Anonymity (Sweeney 2002).
Under this metric, one is concerned with whether a record
is indistinguishable from at least k other data points in the
data set. It was shown in (Aggarwal 2005) that k-anonymity
requires a significant amount of information loss, particu-
larly for higher dimensional data. Further, it was shown in
(Brickell and Shmatikov 2008) that the removal of member-
identifying attributes is typically more effective than most
k-anonymity methods.
An approach to membership inference that is working in
the opposite direction of differential privacy or k-anonymity
is to design effective attacks. Early approaches to designing
these attacks can be seen in (Homer et al. 2008; Backes et al.
2016; Dwork et al. 2015). These are largely based on using
some form of a distance measure to determine how likely it
is that a particular data point is in a subset of the data. One
of the most notable recent efforts in this direction is given
by Shokri et al. in (Shokri et al. 2017) whose shadow model
based attacks are actually used for comparison with the re-
sults in this paper. A work by Rahman et al., empirically
evaluates how well differential privacy techniques do against
these attacks (Rahman et al. 2018). Their research concludes
that to ensure privacy, a significant amount of utility of the
model must be lost.
Results
The main result of this work is the explicit and simple attack
strategy first given in Algorithm 1, and then expanded in
the Categorical Bayesian Take-the-Typical Attack section.
As formalized in Theorem 1, we will see that this strategy
is provably optimal given only access to a model’s training
accuracy, testing accuracy, and the proportion of data used
for the training set within each subset of the data formed by
the partition. We emphasize that this strategy is also easy to
implement. In the simplest case where the partition consists
of only one part, the expected accuracy, recall, and precision
of the method have explicit formulas given in the Metrics
section.
We note that the simplicity of our approach does not come
at the cost of poor performance. Experimentally, we find that
the accuracy of our membership inference attack is very
often comparable with that of the state-of-the-art attacks
of (Shokri et al. 2017), despite our attack not requiring a
trained attack model.
Background
Attack Setting
Each data point z in our data set D consists of an input x
and a true label y. We label these as z = (x, y). We assume
throughout that the attacker has black box access to a tar-
get model M so that given a data point z = (x, y) they can
obtain the output of the model, M(x), which we initially
take as simply being a predicted label. In the Categorical
Bayesian Take-the-Typical Attack section, M(x) is general-
ized to be a probability distribution over all possible labels.
For every data point x, we assume the attacker has access
to the true label y. Additionally, we assume the attacker has
access to the training and testing accuracy for a subset of the
data, which we will see is not an unreasonable assumption in
previously published attacks as well. We lastly assume that
the attacker has knowledge of the proportion of overall data
is being used for training. Considering that these proportions
are often chosen by some commonly known rule of thumb,
an attacker could realistically know this as well.
Assessment and Previous MIAs
The assessment of our attack is based on several commonly
used statistical metrics. These include accuracy, precision,
and recall of the attack. In the simplest case where the data
is not further partitioned, each of these have simple formulas
that allow for their exact computation. Because these values
are compared with the attacks of (Shokri et al. 2017) we
briefly outline how those attacks work here.
Description of SMA: The attack of Shokri et al., has two
main parts. The first is the creation of shadow models and
the second is the creation of an attack model. Within the
shadow model creation phase, a collection of models are cre-
ated which closely imitate the behavior of the target model.
For these shadow models one then knows whether or not a
particular data point was within its training set. Hence, we
can use both the output of the shadow model and a label
of ‘in training set’ or ’not in training set’ to train an attack
model. When given an output of the target model, the attack
model can attempt to infer whether the target model’s input
was in its training set. Although, many of the details of this
attack are omitted, this conveys the essence of the attack. For
notational convenience, we will call this the Shadow Model
Attack which will henceforth abbreviate as SMA.
For assessing the accuracy of the SMA, Shokri et al. set
the number of elements in the training set and the number of
elements not in the training set to be equal. This is a reason-
able assumption, and we adopt it for all experimental evalu-
ations of our attack.
Bayesian Take-the-Typical Attack (BTTA)
This section outlines the most basic version of the attack
where the data set is not partitioned (before considering the
partitioning into training and testing data). We first introduce
some notation.
• The set of inputs is denoted by X and the set of labels is
denoted by Y .
• The data set is D ⊆ X × Y where an element from X
can be used at most once. The set D is partitioned in to
the training set Dtrain and the testing set Dtest.
• The target model is denoted by M , where M is a function
M : X 7→ Y .
Algorithm 1 Bayesian Take-the-Typical Attack (BTTA)
Input: Model M , q, p0, p1, data set D
for z = (x, y) ∈ D do
if M(x) = y then
if qp0 ≥ (1− q)p1 then
report x ∈ Dtrain
else
report x /∈ Dtrain
end if
else if M(x) 6= y then
if q(1− p0) ≥ (1− q)(1− p1) then
report x ∈ Dtrain
else
report x /∈ Dtrain
end if
end if
end for
• The probability that a data point z = (x, y) ∈ D is drawn
from the training set Dtrain is given by q.
• Let A denote the set of data points M correctly classifies,
i.e., A = {z = (x, y) ∈ D :M(x) = y}.
• The accuracy of the modelM on the training set is notated
as p0, i.e., p0 = P (z ∈ A | z ∈ Dtrain).
• The accuracy of the model M on the testing set is notated
as p1, i.e., p1 = P (z ∈ A | z ∈ Dtest).
We will always assume that the model M is more accurate
on Dtrain than on Dtest so that p0 ≥ p1. We are now ready
to present what we call the Bayesian Take-the-Typical At-
tack (BTTA)1. We name it this in contrast to a even simpler
attack we will call Take-the-Typical. In the Take-the-Typical
Attack if q ≥ 1/2 the attacker will always report that the
data point is in the training set and if q < 1/2 the attacker
will always report the data point is not in the training set.
The Take-the-Typical attack ignores the models behaviour
on a input whereas the BTTA exploits it. The derivation of
the BTTA is presented as a proof to Lemma 1, the statement
of which highlights the attack’s most salient feature.
Lemma 1. The Bayesian Take-the-Typical Attack reports
x ∈ Dtrain iff it is more probable x ∈ Dtrain.
Proof. By Bayes rule,
P (z ∈ Dtrain | z ∈ A)
=
P (z ∈ A | z ∈ Dtrain)P (z ∈ Dtrain)
P (z ∈ A)
=
qp0
qp0 + (1− q)p1 .
Setting this greater or equal to 1/2 we see that given the
correct classification, i.e., that z ∈ A, it is more probable
that z ∈ Dtrain when qp0 ≥ (1− q)p1.
1The attack is written to iterate over all elements in D, but of
course could be applied to only a particular element.
Similarly,
P (z ∈ Dtrain | z /∈ A)
=
P (z /∈ A | z ∈ Dtrain)P (z ∈ Dtrain)
P (z /∈ A)
=
q(1− p0)
q(1− p0) + (1− q)(1− p1) .
Setting this greater or equal to 1/2, we can see that given
the misclassification, i.e., that z /∈ A, it most probable z ∈
Dtrain when q(1− p0) ≥ (1− q)(1− p1).
The next theorem is a corollary of the fact that the above
attack strategy picks the most likely answer for any given
data point. Assuming the information we are provided is cor-
rect and the data points we are pulling from are uniformly
distributed, there is no advantage to updating any of our in-
formation and we have Theorem 1. Any attack that made a
choice which was more probable to be incorrect than cor-
rect could be improved in expectation by always taking the
solution which is more probable to be correct.
Theorem 1. Given only the access to the model, training
and test accuracy, the Bayesian Take-the-Typical Attack is
optimal with respect to accuracy.
Now that we have shown the optimality of the BTTA we
next derive formulas for its accuracy, precision, and recall
after which we can relate it to other attacks, namely Shokri
et al’s SMA.
Metrics - Lower Bounds on MIA Vulnerability
The conditional statements in Algorithm 1 allow for the four
cases to be processed differently. We define them now and
will refer to them as Cases 1-4 throughout the paper.
Case 1. qp0 ≥ (1−q)p1 and q(1−p0) ≥ (1−q)(1−p1).
Case 2. qp0 < (1−q)p1 and q(1−p0) < (1−q)(1−p1).
Case 3. qp0 ≥ (1−q)p1 and q(1−p0) < (1−q)(1−p1).
Case 4. qp0 < (1−q)p1 and q(1−p0) ≥ (1−q)(1−p1).
Thanks to the following lemma, we need henceforth only
address Cases 1-3.
Lemma 2. Under the assumption testing accuracy is at least
training accuracy, or p0 ≥ p1, Case 4 will never occur.
Proof. If q > 1− q, then qp0 < (1− q)p1 implies p1 > p0,
which is not possible. On the other hand, if q ≤ 1− q, then
q(1− p0) ≥ (1− q)(1− p1) implies 1− p0 ≥ 1− p1 which
can only happen if p0 and p1 are equal and q = 1/2, but now
the first inequality again fails to be satisfied.
Lemma 3 demonstrates that it can be advantageous to use
the training and testing accuracy within the attack. In fact
there exists a range of values of p0, p1, and q where p0 and
p1 are critical in predicting membership, and where outside
this range p0 and p1 are no longer of any use at all in the
prediction of set membership. The prior of these is captured
by Case 3 and the latter by Cases 1 and 2.
Lemma 3. The accuracy of Bayesian Take-the-Typical At-
tack is always better than or equal to max{q, 1 − q}, the
accuracy of Take-the-Typical.
Proof. Case 1. This coincides with Take-the-typical and al-
ways reports z ∈ Dtrain with accuracy q. This only oc-
curs when q ≥ 1 − q, showing that accuracy is at least
max{q, 1− q}.
Case 2. This coincides with Take-the-typical and always
reports z /∈ Dtrain with accuracy 1 − q. This only occurs
when 1−q > q, showing that accuracy is at least max{q, 1−
q}.
Case 3. The Bayesian Take-the-typical will report z ∈
Dtrain when z ∈ A and will report z /∈ Dtrain when z /∈ A.
The accuracy is then be given by
P (z ∈ Dtrain ∧ z ∈ A) + P (z /∈ Dtrain ∧ z /∈ A)
= qp0 + (1− q)(1− p1) (1)
> qp0 + q(1− p0) = q.
where we used (1 − q)(1 − p1) > q(1 − p0). Also note
that since qp0 ≥ (1− q)p1, we can say
P (z ∈ Dtrain ∧ z ∈ A) + P (z /∈ Dtrain ∧ z /∈ A)
= qp0 + (1− q)(1− p1)
≥ (1− q)p1 + (1− q)(1− p1) = 1− q.
Therefore, the accuracy is at least max{q, 1− q}.
The BTTA has the following attack metrics.
• Expected Accuracy: We again consider the Cases 1-3.
Using the results derived in Lemma 3 we can claim that
in
– Case 1: the expected accuracy is q;
– Case 2: the expected accuracy is 1− q;
– Case 3: since we report z ∈ Dtrain iff z ∈ A the ex-
pected accuracy is given by Equation 1.
• Expected Precision: Abbreviating Dtrain as Dtr, the ex-
pected precision of the BTTA is based on the ratio
P (report z ∈ Dtr ∧ z ∈ Dtr)
P (report z ∈ Dtr ∧ z ∈ Dtr) + P (report z ∈ Dtr ∧ z /∈ Dtr) .
Once again we have Cases 1-3, and in
– Case 1: qq+(1−q) = 1;
– Case 2: the precision is not defined since we never re-
port z ∈ Dtrain;
– Case 3: Since here we report z ∈ Dtrain iff M(x) = y
the above expression is equal to
P (z ∈ A ∧ z ∈ Dtr)
P (z ∈ A ∧ z ∈ Dtr) + P (z ∈ A ∧ z /∈ Dtr)
=
qp0
qp0 + (1− q)p1 . (2)
• Expected Recall: Lastly, the expected recall is based on
the ratio
P (report z ∈ Dtr ∧ z ∈ Dtr)
P (report z ∈ Dtr ∧ z ∈ Dtr) + P (report z /∈ Dtr ∧ z ∈ Dtr) .
We have in
– Case 1: the expected recall is qq+0 = 1;
– Case 2: the expected recall is 00+(1−q)1 = 0;
– Case 3: the expected recall is
P (z ∈ A ∧ z ∈ Dtrain)
P (z ∈ A ∧ z ∈ Dtrain) + P (z /∈ A ∧ z ∈ Dtrain)
=
qp0
qp0 + q(1− p0) = p0.
We focusing on the accuracy to prove Theorem 2. The aim
is to now show that regardless of which ever of the three
cases may apply based on our values of p0, p1 and q, the
accuracy of BTTA is always bound below by the maximum
of the three case’s expected accuracy.
Theorem 2. Given access to a model with generalization
gap g = p0 − p1 ≥ 0 (training accuracy minus test-
ing accuracy) and the ratio of training set to input domain
|A|/|D| = q, there exists a membership inference attack
with expected accuracy at least
max{q, 1− q, qp0 + (1− q)(1− p1)}
≥ max{q, 1− q,min{q, 1− q}(1 + g)} ≥ 1
2
Moreover, given only this information about the model no
attack can have higher accuracy.
Proof. In each Case i ∈ {1, 2, 3} we will demonstrate that
the lower bounds we derived for Case i in Metrics Section is
larger than the lower bounds given for the remaining Cases
{1, 2, 3} − {i}.
For Case 1, max{q, 1−q} = q and min{q, 1−q} = 1−q.
One can check that the only solution to the set of inequalities
q < qp0 + (1− q)(1− p1)
(1− q)p1 ≤ qp0
(1− q)(1− p1) ≤ q(1− p0)
0 ≤ p1 ≤ p0 ≤ 1
is q = 1/2 and p0 = p1, which sets both arguments of the
max function equal. We conclude that in Case 1, the inequal-
ity q ≥ qp0 + (1− q)(1− p1). must hold.
For Case 2, max{q, 1−q} = 1−q and min{q, 1−q} = q
and there is no solution to the set of inequalities
1− q < qp0 + (1− q)(1− p1)
qp0 ≤ (1− q)p1
q(1− p0) ≤ (1− q)(1− p1)
0 ≤ p1 ≤ p0 ≤ 1.
Hence, we can conclude that the inequality 1 − q ≥ qp0 +
(1− q)(1− p1) must hold.
For Case 3, the accuracy is qp0 + (1− p1). Combine this
inequality with Lemma 3 to obtain the proof for the first ex-
pression in the inequality. The second part of the inequality
follows from qp0+(1−p1) ≥ min{q, 1−q}·(p0+1−p1) =
min{q, 1−q} · (1+g). The fact that no other attack can per-
form better follows from Theorem 1.
Accuracy Precision
Dataset Train Test BTTA SMA Difference
Adult 0.848 0.842 0.502 0.503 0.00122
MNIST 0.984 0.928 0.515 0.517 0.00236
Location 1 0.673 0.598 0.678 0.0803
Purchase(2) 0.999 0.984 0.504 0.505 0.00122
Purchase(10) 0.999 0.866 0.536 0.550 0.0143
Purchase(20) 1 0.781 0.561 0.590 0.0285
Purchase(50) 1 0.693 0.591 0.860 0.269
Purchase(100) 0.999 0.659 0.603 0.935 0.332
TX hosp. stay 0.668 0.517 0.564 0.657 0.0933
Table 1: Comparison of SMA experimental results to BTTA
theoretical results.
Comparison of BTTA to SMA
Table 1 demonstrates how this most basic BTTA’s expected
precision compares to the experimentally observed precision
of SMA attack in (Shokri et al. 2017). The value for q used
in the SMA experiments is 1/2 and the values for p0 and p1
for each data set are shown in Table 1. For every data set
we fall into Case 3 and hence we use Equation 2 to compute
precision (this is necessarily true when q = 1/2 and training
accuracy exceeds testing). What is remarkable is how often
the BTTA, which is very simple, does comparably well to
the much more complicated approach taken wellin for SMA.
The average difference in performance across all data sets
tested is roughly 9%, but in cases where the SMA fails to ob-
tain high precision the difference tends to be much smaller.
In these cases, the result seems to imply that SMA is extract-
ing little useful information about the behavior of the target
model beyond the generalization gap between the training
and testing accuracy of the model.
In the next section we take the BTTA a step further, gener-
alizing it to consider the training and testing accuracy on dif-
ferent portions of the partitioned data set. Armed with these
new tools, we will return to our comparison with SMA.
Expanding Bayesian Take-the-Typical Attack
Beyond Generalization Gap
It is natural to ask how much more effective a membership
inference attack can be, given more information about the
behavior of the model. Suppose for instance that one knows
the accuracy of the model on the data points with true label
y? Or instead, what if one knows the accuracy on the data
points which are classified by the model as having label y?
Or, even more complex, suppose rather than just a label, the
model outputs a distribution on the different possible classi-
fications? We would like to be able generalize our attack to
all of these cases and more. The easiest way to do this is to
reformulate the problem as knowing the information used in
Bayesian Take-the-Typical Attack section, training accuracy
p0, testing accuracy p1, and proportion in the training set q,
but for different partitions of the data set D. We will first
formalize this into an attack and then show how it applies to
specific ways of partitioning the data. These formulations of
the attack are the ones which we will use in our experiments.
Categorical Bayesian Take-the-Typical Attack
(CBTTA)
Let (D,P ) be some (finite) data set of input-label pairs
z = (x, y) applied to target model M with probability mea-
sure P . Partition D into finitely many categories (Di) with
sizes (di) for (here, size refers to the ratio of selected data to
the entire data set). Then partition each Di into a training set
Dtraini of size d
train
i and a testing set D
test
i of size d
test
i . Fi-
nally, suppose that model M has accuracy ptraini on D
train
i
and accuracy ptesti on D
test
i with p
train
i ≥ ptesti for i ≤ k.
As before, let A := {(x, y) ∈ D :M(x) = y} denote the
data on which M is accurate. Then di := P (Di), dtraini :=
P (Dtraini ), d
test
i := P (D
test
i ), p
train
i := P (A|Dtraini ),
and ptesti := P (A|Dtesti ).
Note that categorical training proportion qi :=
P (Dtraini |Di), and categorical accuracy pi := P (A|Di) are
defined in terms of previous parameters via qi = dtraini /di
and pi = [ptraini d
train
i + p
test
i d
test
i ]/di. Furthermore, if
Dtrain := ∪ki=1Dtraini and Dtest := ∪ki=1Dtesti , then
the overall training proportion q := P (Dtrain) equals∑k
i=1 qidi and the overall accuracy p := P (A) is given by
p :=
∑k
i=1 pidi =
∑k
i=1(p
train
i d
train
i + p
test
i d
test
i ).
We describe the Categorical Bayesian Take-the-Typical
Attack (CBTTA) as follows: Assume that the attacker only
has black box access to M , knows all data in category Di
and knows parameter values dtraini , d
test
i , p
train
i , and p
test
i
for all i ≤ k. Given data z = (x, y), first determine the
category Cj which contains z; second, apply BTTA (as de-
scribed above) with category train proportion qj , training ac-
curacy ptrainj and testing accuracy p
test
j .
Theorem 3. Given only access to target model M (as a
black box), knowledge of data in category Di, and param-
eter values dtraini , d
test
i , p
train
i , and p
test
i for all i ≤ k,
the Categorical Bayesian Take-the-Typical Attack is optimal
with respect to accuracy.
Proof. If there was an attack that performed better overall
on D than CBTTA, then it would also perform better on Dj
than BTTA on Dj for some j ≤ k with only the parameters
qj , ptrainj , and p
test
j (the other parameters are irrelevant).
However, this contradicts Theorem 1.
In exchange for more effective attacks we pay the price in
added complexity and the loss of nice explicit formulas for
accuracy, precision, and recall. Next, we consider specific
instances of CBTTA.
Partition by True Label (PTL): In this attack the cate-
gories are defined by the true label, specifically Di = {z =
(x, y) ∈ D : y = i}. Assuming that the data set is parti-
tioned into training and testing by sampling at random it is
reasonable to assume that qi = q, where q is the overall pro-
portion of data used for training. Obtaining the testing and
training accuracies of target model will require a different
idea, however. For this we use the idea of shadow models
the same as (Shokri et al. 2017). By training models which
mimic the behavior of the target model we can observe in
this process the individual training accuracy for each cate-
gory. A similar tact will be adopted in our other attacks.
Partition by Predicted Label (PPL): Now we consider
the categories as defined by Di = {z = (x, y) ∈ D :
M(x) = i}. Like last time the training and texting accuracy
can be observed from the shadow model. The only major
difference arises from how we obtain the values for qi. Now,
we cannot assume qi = q. Instead we use the final trained
shadow models, apply them acrossD and count for each cat-
egory how many of the data points mapped to that category
came from the training set.
Partition by True Label Confidence (PTC): Like in
partition by predicted label, the partitions are determined
by the output of the model. In this attack the categories
are defined by the confidence level assigned to the true la-
bel. The interval [0, 1] is partitioned into the subintervals
I1 = [0, 1/n), I2 = [1/n, 2/n),..., In = [(n − 1)/n, 1].
Letting My(x) denote the probability that the model assigns
to x having its true label y, the partitioning of D is given by
Di = {z = (x, y) ∈ D :My(x) ∈ Ii}. Testing and training
accuracies along relative proportion in the training set can
be obtained as above.
Partition by Predicted Label Confidence (PPC): Here
we look at the probabilities assigned (out of m possible la-
bels) to the model’s predicted choice which lie in [1/m, 1]
(there is always a probability of at least 1/m in the predic-
tion vector; otherwise they will not add to 1) and partition
the output into n intervals of equal length (m− 1)/mn; i.e.,
I1 = [1/m, 1/m + (m − 1)/mn), I2 = [1/m + (m −
1)/mn, 1/m + 2(m − 1)/mn), . . . , In = [1/m + (n −
1)(m − 1)/mn, 1]. Letting Mj(x) denote the probability
that the model assigns to x having label j, the partitioning is
given by Di := {z = (x, y) ∈ D : maxj(Mj(x)) ∈ Ii} for
i ≤ n. The necessary values for training accuracy, testing
accuracy, and qi can all be approximated through shadow
models.
Combining Partition Techniques:
The techniques above can be combined to increase the ef-
fectiveness of the CBTTA. To do so, you intersect categories
from each method to form the categories for the combina-
tion. Some examples of combinations like Predicted Label
with Predicted Label Confidence or True Label with True
Label Confidence are reasonable and intuitive to employ be-
cause a model may perform differently on data between dif-
ferent confidence levels and between labels. However, it is
ill-advised to combine the True Label and the Predicted La-
bel techniques, as it results in trival categories with either
zero accuracy or perfect accuracy, which leads the attack be-
coming TTA.
This list is by no means exhaustive. One interesting con-
sequence of the optimality of CBTTA and the possibility of
trying endless combinations of ways to partition the data set
is the idea of using the partitions to uncover which infor-
mation other attacks are exploiting to successfully perform
membership inference. We will see that the way the data is
partitioned can have a noticeable effect on the performance
of CBTTA.
Experimental Evaluation
Here we present the results from implementations of our
Bayesian attack and the state-of-the-art shadow model mem-
Attack Accuracy Precision Recall
BTTA 0.746 0.663 1.000
PTL 0.746 0.663 1.000
PPL 0.746 0.663 1.000
PTC 0.777 0.725 0.988
PPC 0.778 0.728 0.985
SMA 0.793 0.715 0.973
Table 2: Performance of Bayesian Attacks and Shadow
Model Attack (SMA) on the target model trained on 10,000
CIFAR-10 data points. Baseline accuracy 0.5 (See Categori-
cal Bayesian Take-the-Typical Attack section) for a descrip-
tion of each attack).
bership inference attack. All of our experiments attack a tar-
get neural network trained on the CIFAR-10 dataset. In or-
der to produce target networks with generalization gaps of
different magnitudes, we vary the size of the training set.
Experimental Setup
Data: We use CIFAR-10, a benchmark dataset for image
recognition. CIFAR-10 is made of 60, 000 32 × 32 color
images in 10 different classes, with 6, 000 images in each
class. We train our target model on training sets of sizes
2500, 5000, 10000, and 15000 images from CIFAR-10.
Target Model: Our target model is a convolutional neural
network with two convolutional and max pooling layers, two
hidden layers of sizes 120 and 84, and a SoftMax output. Our
activation function is ReLu. We chose our learning rate to be
0.001 and our maximum number of epochs of training to be
100.
Shadow Model Attack: We replicated the shadow model at-
tack presented in (Shokri et al. 2017). For each target model,
we trained 10 shadow models on CIFAR-10 data disjoint
from the target training set. These shadow models had the
same architecture as the target model and were trained iden-
tically. We then collected the outputs of the shadow models
on training and testing data to train the attack neural net-
works. For each category of images in CIFAR-10, we trained
an attack neural network to predict whether or not a given
image was in the shadow training set. Our attack networks
had two hidden layers of size 50 and used ReLu activation
functions.
Results
The objective of each attacker is to determine which data
points were in the target model’s training set. We evaluate
our attacks and compare the results to the Shadow Model At-
tack (SMA) by executing these procedures on random sam-
ples of the target model’s train and test data sets. In our eval-
uation we use train and test data sets of identical sizes, so
that the baseline membership inference attack accuracy for
random guessing is 0.5.
In general, we found the performance of the categorical
attacks, and particularly the predicted label partition attack,
comparable with the performance of the shadow model at-
tack. This is striking considering that our attack has no pa-
rameters or training procedure and only relies on a handful
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Figure 1: Precision of SMA and PPC on CIFAR-10.
of statistics about the target model.
Interestingly, the different partition schemes in our cat-
egorical Bayesian attacks provide only a moderate im-
provement to the vanilla Bayesian Take the Typical Attack
(BTTA). Indeed, in Table 2 the Partition by True Label
(PTL) and Partition by Predicted Label (PPL) attacks have
performance identical to BTTA. We note that if all categories
of a partitioned Bayesian attack CA1 are a subset of some
category in a partitioned Bayesian attack CA2, then the ac-
curacy of CA1 is no less than that of CA2.
For all remaining evaluations of our Bayesian attacks, we
use the predicted label partitioning scheme (PPL). We plot
the categorical precision of the shadow model attack and the
Bayesian attack on all CIFAR-10 data sets in Figure 1. We
found the recall to be above 0.95 for all attackers on all data
sets.
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Figure 2: Scatter plot showing the training and testing ac-
curacies of the shadow models trained on 10,000 CIFAR-10
images. The training and testing accuracy of the correspond-
ing target model is indicated by the red line.
Not surprisingly, the accuracies of the Bayesian attack and
the Shadow Model Attack of (Shokri et al. 2017) decrease
as the target model is trained on larger data sets. As the train
set size increases, the target model becomes less overfit, de-
creasing its generalization gap and its vulnerability to attack.
The only information exploited by our Bayesian attack is the
categorical generalization gap. Because the Shadow Model
Attack performs comparably to the Bayesian attack, it must
be extracting the same information as the Bayes attack or in-
formation with comparable predictive power. In the CIFAR-
10, Shadow Model Train and Test Accuracy Figure (see Ap-
pendix) it can be seen that the train and test accuracies of the
100 shadow models are distributed tightly near the training
and testing accuracies of the target model. This suggests that
the shadow data the attack networks trained on has the same
train and test statistics as the target model, and that this gen-
eralization gap is what’s being learned by the attack models
of (Shokri et al. 2017) during training.
It is worth discussing the different assumptions made by
each attack. The Shadow Model Attack assumes we have ac-
cess to data drawn from the same distribution as the target
model’s training data, as well as the target model’s architec-
ture and training procedure. On the other hand, our Bayesian
attack assumes only knowledge of some true statistics of the
target model’s performance on the train and test sets. This
assumption is reasonable in practice as the categorical train-
ing and testing accuracy of a machine learning model is fre-
quently made public.
Conclusion
We introduced the Bayesian Take-the-Typical Attack
(BTTA), a simple, yet effective, attack. The BTTA algorithm
requires no trained attack model, unlike many other MIA
methods, including the Shadow Model Attack of (Shokri
et al. 2017). Furthermore, we showed that in restricted set-
tings where the attacker knows only the testing accuracy,
training accuracy, the knowledge of the proportion of the
training set to the total data, along with the label predicted
by the model for all data points, BTTA is a provably optimal
attack.
Additionally, we generalized BTTA to a more sophisti-
cated class of attacks, CBTTA, where the attacker has more
knowledge of the model. We again proved this attack is
theoretically optimal in terms of expected accuracy, and
performed experimental comparisons with a state-of-the-art
MIA method. In doing so we were able to observe in which
cases the state-of-the-art attack learned more useful infor-
mation than our CBTTA attacker had access to.
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Appendix A
Assumptions Known by Attacker.
For all i ≤ k:
Di i-th category
dtraini := P (D
train
i ) size of data in D
train
i
dtesti := P (D
test
i ) size of data in D
test
i
ptraini := P (A|Dtraini ) accuracy of M in Dtraini
ptesti := P (A|Dtesti ) accuracy of M in Dtesti
Other Features.
For all i ≤ k:
di := P (Di) size of data in Di
qi := P (D
train
i |Di) training proportion in Di
pi := P (A|Di) accuracy of M in Di
q := P (Dtrain) overall training proportion
p := P (A) overall accuracy of M
We provide details for various statements and claims from
Section on the Categorical Bayesian Take-the-Typical At-
tack.
Claim 1.
di = d
train
i + d
test
i
di : = P (Di) = P (D
train
i ∪Dtesti )
= P (Dtraini ) + P (D
test
i ) = d
train
i + d
test
i .
Claim 2.
qidi = d
train
i
qidi : = P (D
train
i |Di)P (Di) = P (Dtraini ∩Di)
= P (Dtraini ) = d
train
i .
Claim 3.
pidi = p
train
i d
train
i + p
test
i d
test
i
pidi : = P (A|Di)P (Di) = P (A ∩Di)
= P (A ∩Dtraini ) + P (A ∩Dtesti )
= P (A|Dtraini )P (Dtraini ) + P (A|Dtesti )P (Dtesti )
= ptraini d
train
i + p
test
i d
test
i .
Claim 4.
q =
k∑
i=1
qidi
q : = P (Dtrain) =
k∑
i=1
P (Dtraini )
=
k∑
i=1
dtraini =
k∑
i=1
qidi.
Claim 5.
p =
k∑
i=1
pidi
p : = P (A) =
k∑
i=1
P (A ∩Di) =
k∑
i=1
pidi.
